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Abstract:  Improving  the  economic  performance  of  fisheries  is  becoming  increasingly 
important in fisheries management, and in some cases, maximum economic yield (MEY) is 
set as a key management target. However, associated with MEY is a level of fishing activity 
that is lower than would otherwise occur, even in fisheries managed to achieve the maximum 
sustainable yield. This will result in losses in economic activity elsewhere in the economy, 
potentially resulting in a net loss to society in the short to medium term. In this paper, an 
input-output framework is used to estimate the net economic impact of achieving MEY in 
Australian  fisheries.  While  incomes  are  reduced  in  other  sectors  of  the  economy,  the  net 
impact of achieving MEY in fisheries is dependent on how total catches are likely to change 
relative to their levels under current management. It is argued that, at least in most Australian 
fisheries, achieving MEY will result in a net economic benefit to society. Local communities 
are likely to be included among the set of main beneficiaries, with potential losses being 
incurred elsewhere in the economy. Sectors that potentially lose as a result of the transition to 
MEY previously benefited from overcapitalisation in fisheries, and hence higher incomes in 
these sectors were an artefact of the market failure in fisheries. 
 
Key words: maximum economic yield, fisheries management, net economic impact, input-
output analysis 
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Net economic impacts of achieving maximum economic yield in 
fisheries 
 
Over the last decade, there has been increasing interest in the use of economic instruments in 
the  management  of  fisheries.(2006;  Sanchirico  2003),  and  the  benefits  from  achieving 
economically  optimal  levels  of  harvest  (Costello  et  al.  2008;  Grafton  et  al.  2007). 
Internationally, while most fisheries management policies aim to achieve a wide range of 
objectives  (Hilborn  2007),  economic  objectives  are  gaining  increasing  importance  in 
determining fisheries management strategies (e.g. Pascoe et al. 2009; Ward and Kelly 2009);. 
 
In Australia, the Australian Fisheries Management Act 1991, which relates to Commonwealth 
fisheries, specifies maximising economic efficiency as a key management objective. As noted 
above, inclusion of economic objectives is common in most fisheries legislation, but what this 
means for  fisheries management is  generally poorly defined  (Hilborn 2007). However, in 
2007,  the  Australian  Commonwealth  fisheries  harvest  strategy  policy  was  developed  that 
specifies that harvest strategies “will be designed to pursue maximum economic yield in the 
fisheries” (DAFF 2007, p4). Maximum economic yield (MEY) in turn is defined as “[t]he 
sustainable catch or effort level for a commercial fishery that allows net economic returns to 
be maximised” (DAFF 2007, p54). Consequently, since 2007, MEY has been considered the 
primary target reference point for Commonwealth fisheries. State fisheries managers are also 
becoming  increasingly  interested  in  MEY  as  a  management  target,  with  State  fisheries 
observers on most Commonwealth fisheries management advisory bodies. 
 
Fishing at MEY will maximise economic profit to the vessel owners, and is also likely to 
increase crew wages depending on the share system used in the fishery and the state of the   4 
stocks  currently.  In  fishing  dependent  coastal  communities,  higher  incomes  will  increase 
demand  for  other  products  in  the  local  economy,  with  subsequent  flow  on  effects  in 
production, incomes and employment. Also the extra profits can through taxes benefit society 
as a whole by using this surplus into public investments. However, opponents to economic 
management  instruments  argue  that  achieving  MEY  may  also  have  negative  impacts  on 
fishers and other groups (e.g. McCay 2000; McCay 1995; Palsson and Helgason 1995). This 
is because reducing the excess fishing effort to achieve MEY is likely to result in a decrease 
in the number of fishing vessels, which in turn will result in a decrease in employment and 
hence in the wages spent on the local economy. Similarly, those industries supplying the 
fishing industry will realise a decline in demand for their products, with subsequent flow on 
effects to the rest of the economy  (Heen and Flaaten 2007). Others argue that producing 
yields lower than the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) result in fewer benefits further along 
the value chain (i.e. processing, retail etc) that add (and therefore produce) more value than 
the  fishing  process  itself  (Christensen  2009).  Overall,  opponents  argue  that,  potentially, 
achieving MEY in fisheries – as it is traditionally defined – may result in a net economic loss 
when these flow on effects are considered (Bromley 2009). 
 
In this paper, the net economic impact of achieving MEY in Australian fisheries is estimated 
using an input-output modelling framework. The key winners and losers are also identified. A 
number of scenarios are examined in terms of the implications of MEY in terms of fisheries 
production and input use for a range of different types of fisheries. Increases in profit levels in 
fisheries is compared to reductions in incomes both in fisheries and induced through changes 
in input demands.  
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Implications of MEY for effort, revenue and net economic returns 
 
While the term “MEY” refers to a yield or level of output, MEY is more a concept than actual 
value (Dichmont et al. 2009). Unlike maximum sustainable yield (MSY), which is an actual 
harvest  level,  MEY  requires  both  output  and  input  use  to  be  simultaneously  at  their 
economically optimal levels. Inputs include fishing effort (an abstract concept encompassing 
the level of physical vessel inputs used in the fishery as well as their utilisation) as well as the 
stock biomass. Similar yields to MEY can be achieved with different combinations of effort 
and biomass, but only one such combination will result in economic rents being maximised in 
the fishery.  
 
The traditional bioeconomic model of the fishery assumes that the price of outputs is perfectly 
elastic and the marginal cost of effort (i.e. labour, capital and other inputs employed in the 
fishery) is constant. Given this, and assuming logistic growth for the stock biomass, both the 
catch and the revenue curves will have a similar quadratic shape, and the cost curve will be 
linear (Figure 1). Given this model, MEY can be defined as the combination of effort (EMEY) 
and output (MEY=RMEY/price) that maximised the difference between the revenue and cost 
curves, and is identified as the point where the slope of the revenue curve is equal to the slope 
of the cost curve (i.e. marginal revenue equals marginal cost). In most fisheries, the effort 
level exceeds this optimal level as the existence of economic rents provides an incentive for 
additional effort to enter the fishery. The resulting equilibrium output level may be higher or 
lower than at MEY depending on the slope of the cost curve. In high unit cost fisheries, the 
level of output at MEY may be lower than the unregulated (or open access equilibrium) yield 
level (i.e. ROAE1), while in low unit cost fisheries the output at MEY may be greater than the 
unregulated  level  (i.e.  ROAE2).  Management  can  also  affect  the  combination  of  effort  and   6 
output, resulting in the level of output at MEY diverging from the current harvest levels. In 
most  cases,  stocks  are  not  in  equilibrium,  so  that  the  current  catch  may  differ  to  its 
equilibrium level. This may be a result of management that restricts catch or effort. Hence, 
actual catches in a high cost fishery may be lower than at MEY even though the equilibrium 
catch level is expected to be higher. 
 
Figure 1. Approximately here 
 
In practice, MEY is not as simple to define (Dichmont et al. 2009). The optimal level of 
effort, and associated catch, vary with changes in input and output prices. Further, fleets are 
not homogeneous, so the marginal cost of effort – even if constant for individual vessels – 
changes as the fleet composition changes. Further, the model illustrated in Figure 1 relates to 
a single species fishery harvested using  a single technology. However, most fisheries are 
characterised  by  a  number  of  fishing  systems  that  catch  a  variety  of  species  in  differing 
combinations.  Globally  optimal  catches  of  the  different  species  and  effort  levels  for  the 
different fishing technologies can be estimated, but these bear little relationship to an optimal 
catch  of  an  individual  species  considered  in  isolation,  or  the  optimal  effort  level  of  an 
individual fleet segment.  
 
Despite the difficulty of defining the level of effort required to reach MEY, the principle is 
still the same. Economic rent is maximised at the point where there is the highest difference 
between the costs of harvesting the fish and the revenues obtained from the catch. Although 
equilibrium catches at MEY may be higher or lower than the current disequilibrium catches, 
MEY in most instances will require a reduction in fishing effort in the form of a reduction in 
the number of fishing vessels. In the traditional single species model, it can be shown that the   7 
effort at MEY is half that at the open access equilibrium (Clark 1990). Empirical studies in a 
wide range of multispecies fisheries have suggested that fleet reductions in excess of 50% 
may be necessary to maximise economic profits, even those currently subject to management 
(Eggert and Tveteras 2007; Hoff and Frost 2007; Pascoe 2007). This reduction in capacity 
necessary to achieve MEY is also accompanied by a reduction in employment, and hence 
incomes of the crews subsequently displaced. Lower yields at MEY may also result in the 
total income to the remaining crew also declining. The magnitude of this change will largely 
depend on the crew payment system.
1 For crew that are paid on the basis of revenue share, 
then total crew incomes will move in direct proportion to the total yield. For crew that are 
paid on the basis of net revenue (i.e. revenue less running costs such as fuel), then higher 
stock levels may result in reduced cost per unit catch (the so-called stock effect; Clark and 
Munro 1975), and crew incomes may increase even if total yields (and revenues) decrease. At 
the  individual  crew  member  level,  incomes  are  likely  to  increase  regardless  of  payment 
system, as the total number of crew members is likely to decrease by more than any decline in 
yield at MEY.  
 
The economic impact of achieving MEY will have a flow on effect to other intermediate and 
final demand sectors in the economy. In the intermediate sector, some sectors supply the 
fishing sector with goods and services (e.g., fuel, equipment, insurance) and other sectors 
higher up the supply chain (e.g., processors, retailers) demand fish products. For suppliers to 
the fishing sector, a reduction in capacity will reduce demand of inputs. This in turn will make 
the manufacturers of these inputs reduce demand of other goods from their suppliers and so 
on.  
 
                                                 
1 See McConnell and Price (2006) for a review of crew payment systems.   8 
For intermediate sectors demanding fish products (like processors) changes in supply will 
have  a direct  consequence upon these sectors, and indirect impacts on  other intermediate 
sectors supplying these sectors. The extent of this impact will depend on the dependency of 
these sectors in the domestic fishing industry as well as the level of catches at MEY compared 
to current disequilibrium catches. In most countries that have experienced declines in fish 
supply  due  to  overfishing,  processors  and  other  related  sectors  have  largely  managed  to 
source their product elsewhere, or have been relatively able to adapt their production to other 
products (Wilen 2009). As a result, the potential negative impacts of moving to an MEY 
target is likely to be relatively minor for these sectors.  
 
The  final  demand  sector  represents  the  purchase  of  intermediate  goods  and  services  by 
consumers. The loss of income from the displaced crew will reduce final demand of goods 
and services although; this loss can be offset by the remaining crew’s incomes if catches 
increase  at  MEY  relative  to  current  disequilibrium  catches.  Finally,  the  increase  in 
profitability with increased efficiency can benefit society as a whole through increased taxes 
by  using  this  surplus  into  public  investments.  Overall,  the  net  economic  returns  from  a 
broader perspective will only increase if the improvement in fishery profitability as well as 
incomes  to  crew  exceeds  the  losses  in  other  sectors  of  the  economy.  This  is  largely  an 
empirical question, and is likely to differ from fishery to fishery based on the differing input 
needs of the different fishing technologies.  
 
Overview of Australian fisheries 
 
In Australia, fisheries management responsibilities are divided between the Commonwealth 
Government  (i.e.  the  federal  level  of  government)  and  the  individual  State  Governments.   9 
Fisheries wholly within State territorial waters (within 3 nautical miles of the coast) of a 
single State are fully under the jurisdiction of that State Governments. Fisheries that are fully 
outside  the  3  nautical  mile  zone  are  fully  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Commonwealth 
government. Management responsibilities for fisheries that straddle the State-Commonwealth 
boundary are determined through an “Offshore Constitutional Settlement”. Management of 
these  fisheries  varies  considerably,  ranging  from  individual  transferable  quotas  (ITQs)  in 
many fisheries to basic input controls (e.g. limited entry and closures) in others.  
 
Australian  fisheries  are  dominated  by  high  valued  species,  such  as  lobster,  abalone  and 
prawns (Figures 2 and 3). In 2006-07, the total value of Australian fisheries production was 
$1.4 billion (ABARE 2008), with around 80 per cent of the value of this catch taken in State 
managed  waters.  While  the  specific  target  of  MEY  relates  to  Commonwealth  fisheries, 
considerable  interest  has  also  been  shown  by  State  governments,  particularly  for  lobster 
fisheries in the first instance. 
 
Figures 2 and 3 around here 
 
The rock lobster fisheries are Australia's most valuable, accounting for 20% of total fisheries 
revenue in 2006-07. These are managed at both the Commonwealth and state fishery level. 
The Commonwealth rock lobster fishery, located in Torres Strait, exploits the tropical rock 
lobster (Panulirus ornatus), and is managed through both input (seasonal closure, boat and 
gear  restrictions)  and  output  controls  (size  limit).  State  fisheries  (South  Australia,  West 
Australia, Tasmania, New South Wales and Victoria) mainly fish the southern rock lobster 
(Jasus edwardsii). State fisheries use quota management systems (total allowable catches, and 
ITQs in some states), as well as input controls such as limited pot numbers and fishing time.   10 
 
Tropical prawn fisheries are ocean based, while temperate prawn fisheries are more estuary 
based. Geographically, the tropical prawn fisheries include the State prawn fisheries in New 
South Wales, Queensland and Western Australia, and the Commonwealth prawn fisheries in 
the northern Australian waters (the northern prawn fishery, or NPF) and Torres Strait (Figure 
3). The temperate prawn fisheries include those of South Australia and Victoria (Figure 3). 
All  prawn  fisheries  are  currently  managed  using  input  controls,  although  ITQs  are  to  be 
introduced  in  the  NPF  (AFMA  2004;  Newton  et  al.  2007).  The  Commonwealth  prawn 
fisheries have an explicit management objective of MEY, and both the NPF and Torres Strait 
prawn fisheries have had substantial capacity reductions during 2005 and 2006 in order to 
help achieve this objective.  
 
The tuna and billfish fisheries include the eastern and western tuna and billfish fisheries, 
southern  bluefin  tuna  and  the  skipjack  tuna  fishery,  and  are  all  under  Commonwealth 
jurisdiction.  The eastern tuna and billfish fishery is dominant in volume but second in value 
to the southern bluefin tuna fishery (Hohnen et al. 2008). In general, the tuna and billfish 
fisheries are overfished due to effort and catches not being restricted effectively in the past. 
New  management  arrangements  for  capping  effort,  and  the  introduction  of  individual 
transferable effort units, are being developed for the eastern tuna and billfish fishery. The 
southern bluefin tuna fishery is currently subject to  ITQs. Other finfish fisheries are in a 
similar situation to the tuna fisheries. The Commonwealth fisheries are all managed using 
ITQs, but non-binding limits on catches have resulted in limited capacity reduction (Pascoe 
and Gibson 2009) and subsequently excessive fishing effort. This high fishing effort has lead 
to  low  and  even  negative  net  economic  returns  (Newton  et  al.  2007).  As  with  the 
Commonwealth prawn fisheries, the Commonwealth fisheries (both tuna and other finfish)   11 
were also subjected to capacity reductions during 2005 and 2006 as part of a national capacity 
reduction program.  
 
The input-output methodology 
 
Input-Output  (I-O)  analysis  was  first  introduced  by  Leontief  (1941).  Since  then,  I-O  has 
commonly  been  employed  by  environmental  and  resource  economists  (Druckman  and 
Jackson 2009; Eide and Heen 2002; Kronenberg 2009; Llop 2008; Spörri et al. 2007). I-O is 
built in the notion that the production of output requires inputs. In other words, the production 
of  industries,  such  as  fish  by  fishers  requires  inputs  such  as  bait,  food,  ice,  fuel,  boats, 
insurance, etc. In turn the manufacturers of these other goods will need to buy goods from 
their suppliers and so on, thereby creating a multiplier effect.  
 
The  inputs  and  outputs  for  every  industry  in  the  economy  are  summarized  in  an  I-O 
transaction table. This table is the base of the I-O model and it is defined in terms of a series 
of equations, given as:  
  s X Y X a
s
j
i i j ij " = + ∑
=1
  (1) 
where aij is the proportion of total production of industry i that is sold to industry j as an 
intermediate input into industry j, Yi the sales from industry i to final demand, Xi the total 
sales of industry i, and s the number of industry sectors. In matrix form, this can be expressed 
as (I-A)X=Y. The level of production in each sector can therefore be determined by  
X=(I-A)
-1Y, where A is the intermediate usage matrix and Z=(I-A)
-1 is the open Leontief 
inverse.  In  an  open  input-output  model  only  the  productive  sectors  of  the  economy  are 
assumed to be endogenous while the final demand of goods and services are assumed to be 
exogenous. In a closed input-output model, one more column and row, for total household   12 
consumption and fishers’ wages are included into the A matrix. This will form a new matrix 
B and (I-B)
-1 which is the closed Leontief inverse matrix. B^ rows and columns will represent 
the  same  rows  and  columns  as  Z.  The  matrices  B^,  and  Z  are  used  to  derive  the  I-O 
multipliers. Further details are provided in the supporting information. 
 
Three different types of effects make up multipliers – the direct effect, the production induced 
effect and the consumption induced effect. The initial effect (or direct effect) refers to the 
initial dollars spent: if there is an increase in the final demand for a particular product, there 
will be an equivalent increase in production in order to satisfy demand. For example, a one 
unit increase in final demand will result in a one unit increase in production. The production 
induced  effect  (or  intermediate  effect)  is  the  purchase  of  extra  goods  and  services  by 
producers in order to supply the extra goods demanded by the direct effect. The producers of 
these intermediate inputs will also subsequently need to increase their input use to meet this 
demand, and so on.  As a result of the direct and production induced effects, the level of 
household income throughout the economy will increase as a result of higher employment. A 
proportion  of  this  extra  income  will  be  re-spent  on  final  goods  and  services  in  the  local 
economy. This is the consumption induced effect (or induced effect).   
 
 
Data and assumptions 
 
The Input-Output table  
 
The model  was derived from the latest  Australian national  I-O table  available (2004-05), 
produced by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). The 109 sectors in the ABS national I-  13 
O  table  were  aggregated  into  10  sectors,
2  and  the  fishing  sector  (one  of  the  10)  was 
disaggregated  into  13  sectors.  Capture  fisheries  were  disaggregated  into  seven  sectors  – 
abalone, rock lobster, tuna and billfish, other finfish, temperate prawns, tropical prawns and 
other  fisheries,  the  latter  consisting  of  crustacean  and  mollusc  fisheries  not  elsewhere 
included.  Aquaculture  was  disaggregated  into  six  sectors  –  prawns,  salmon,  tuna,  edible 
oysters, pearls and other farmed fish. As the study was not concerned with aquaculture, these 
were not further considered separately. 
 
The  disaggregation  of  the  capture  fisheries  was  based  on  the  values  of  production,  cost 
structure information and the distribution of production to other intermediate sectors and final 
consumers. Information on cost structures in the disaggregated sectors was obtained from a 
number  of  sources,  primarily  based  on  costs  and  earnings  studies  in  these  sectors  (see 
supplementary information for full details, including the final I-O table). 
 
Assumptions relating to input reductions and yields at MEY 
 
As noted previously, moving to MEY will require a reduction on fishing effort and hence 
capacity of the fishery. The extent of this reduction will depend on the existing level of total 
fishing  effort,  capacity  and  stocks  relative  to  this  required  to  achieve  to  MEY.  Previous 
studies in other fisheries have considered a considerable reduction in the fishing fleet capacity 
of between 50 and 79% to maximise economic profits in range of European fisheries that 
were both overcapitalised and overexploited (Eggert and Tveteras 2007; Hoff and Frost 2007; 
                                                 
2 The ten aggregated industries were agriculture and forestry; fishing; mining; processed food 
and drinks; textile and wood products; fuel, chemicals and metal products; boats, machinery 
and equipment; construction, manufacture and repairs; and government and services.   14 
Pascoe 2007). In 2005 and 2006, fleet sizes in Commonwealth fisheries were reduced by 
between 30% and 60% (with an average of 46%) as part of a $150 million Commonwealth 
Government buyback scheme (DAFF 2007). This was instigated to reduce overcapacity in the 
fisheries in order to improve the biological sustainability and economic performance in these 
fisheries. In the Western Australian rock lobster fishery, estimates of MEY suggest that vessel 
numbers would need to decrease by around 50-60% (WA Department of Fisheries 2009). 
 
For most Australian fisheries, catch and effort at MEY has not been assessed. In the northern 
prawn fishery, catches of tiger prawns at MEY are estimated to be around 16% higher than 
current catch levels (Kompas et al. 2008). Similarly, in the south east fishery, total catches at 
MEY are expected to be around 30% greater than current levels, although in the short terms 
catches of some species will need to be decreased (Kompas et al. 2008). In contrast, estimates 
of the catch at MEY in the Western Australian rock lobster fishery were 10 per cent lower 
than the current catch levels (WA Department of Fisheries 2009). However, price increases 
resulting  from  changes  in  fisher  behaviour  (e.g.  targeting  larger  lobsters)  may  more  than 
offset the decrease in catch, resulting in higher revenues at MEY. 
 
Given that MEY has not been assessed for most Australian fisheries, a number of scenarios 
were examined and applied equally to all fisheries.
3 For the purposes of the analysis, it was 
                                                 
3 Abalone were excluded from the analyses. The commercial fisheries have been effectively 
controlled (in most cases through ITQs) for many years and are already extremely profitable. 
Stocks are also exploited heavily by recreational fishers and illegal poachers (attracted by the 
high profitability in the fishery). A substantial capacity reduction in the commercial sector is 
likely to have less of an impact on total fishery profitability than a reduction in recreational 
and illegal activities.     15 
assumed that all fleets would need to be reduced by 50% in order to achieve MEY. This is an 
assumption rather than an actual known requirement to achieve MEY, but is consistent with 
the degree of capacity reduction found in the previously cited studies. For fisheries already 
closer to MEY or even MSY, this assumption will result in an overly pessimistic impact on 
regional economies.  Further, we are using national rather than regional multipliers. At the 
regional  level,  multipliers  are  usually  lower  that  the  national  level  as  many  inputs  are 
imported into the region. Hence, impacts in the immediate coastal communities are likely to 
be lower than the national impacts estimated in the analysis. 
 
Output levels (and hence revenue) may also vary from the current values at MEY, depending 
on  catch  levels  at  MEY  relative  to  the  current  (base  year)  catches.  The  analysis  was 
undertaken with a range of alternative revenue outcomes, including an increase by either five 
or  10%,  no  change,  or  decrease  by  either  five  or  10%.  These  assumptions  are  relatively 
conservative  since  previously  cited  examples  suggested  that,  for  the  limited  number  of 
Australian fisheries in which, MEY has been assessed, catches at MEY may range from 10% 
lower to 30% higher than the 2004-05 levels In the short term, if the fishery has severely 
depleted stocks, then greater reductions in catch may be necessary, although catches would be 
expected to subsequently increase by more than 10%.  
 
Input costs would also decrease as fleet size decreased. However, the full 50% reduction in 
line with fleet capacity was not imposed as some underutilised capacity no doubt existed, so 
some increase in individual effort is likely in response to the higher profits. A key input to 
fisheries production is fuel. These costs were assumed to decrease by 40%, assuming that 
recovery  of  overfished  stocks  and  reduced  crowding  externalities  will  increase  individual 
catch rates.    16 
 
Reduced  capacity  will  reduce  the  number  of  licences,  and  the  extent  of  government 
management  services  that  need  to  be  provided.  However,  many  of  these  services  are  not 
related to the fleet size (e.g. stock assessments), and there is also a smaller pool of vessels to 
pay  for  these  services.  As  a  result,  management  costs  (provided  by  the  Government  and 
services sector) were assumed to decline by only 25%. Other intermediate inputs were also 
assumed to decline by only 45%, as increased individual activity would increase the use of 
these inputs.  
 
Crew are currently paid a proportion of the  revenue.  It was assumed that this proportion 
would remain constant (i.e. the fewer crew would all be paid individually more), with the total 
payments varying with the assumption about revenues under MEY. 
 
Scenarios and results 
 
Production, consumption and total income multipliers 
 
The production (indirect), consumption (induced) and total income multiplier values for the 
six wild fishing sectors examined (i.e. excluding abalone) for the base model (i.e. 2004-05) 
and the five “MEY” scenarios are given in Table 1. For example, from the base model, for 
each Australian dollar of sales generated by the wild tuna industry there will be a total of 
$3.57
4 respectively in income generated by businesses in Australia. Of this, $1.00 is solely the 
                                                 
4 All values are in Australian dollars in 2004-05 prices. 
 
   17 
impact of a direct change in demand for tuna, while, $1.17 and $1.40 represent the additional 
production and consumption induced effects respectively in other sectors of the economy. For 
the production and consumption income multipliers a value greater than one implies that the 
respective induced effects of a change in income are greater than the direct effects.  
 
Table 1. Approximately here 
 
The  differences  in  value  for  the  production,  consumption  and  total  income  multipliers 
generally relate to differences in the cost structure of the sector. This is both across sectors for 
a given scenario, and between scenarios for a given sector. The income multiplier is largely 
dependent on the proportion of wages to other intermediate inputs. The smaller are wages to 
other inputs, the higher the income multiplier. This is because a change in demand required to 
generate an extra dollar in wages will have a bigger impact to other industries supplying 
inputs to the sector under consideration.  
 
Economic distribution effect and net impact of achieving “MEY” 
 
The changes in direct, production (indirect) and consumption (induced) income effects and 
net economic impacts in the different scenario analyses (no change, 5 and 10% increase and 5 
and 10% decline in catches) compared to the base year are presented in Table 2. The net 
economic impacts are estimated after evaluating the direct effect (wages and profits to the 
fishery) and the production and consumption induced effects. As would be expected, profits 
to the fishing sectors have increased with a reduction in capacity under all scenarios, while 
total wages varied depending upon the output assumption.  
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Table 2 Approximately here 
 
The impacts of wages in other intermediate sectors (indirect effect) and consumption (induced 
effect)  were  estimated  by  multiplying  the  wages  obtained  in  fisheries  by  the  appropriate 
income multiplier (From Table 2). Overall, income in intermediate sectors decline the most 
followed by consumption expenditure. This is not surprising since reduction in capacity has 
reduced the need for inputs from intermediate sectors, including labour. Consumption induced 
effects derive from changes in incomes (wages in particular) in both the fisheries and other 
intermediate sectors. While the latter is affected by the capacity reduction (which is fixed 
under all scenarios), the former depends on the level of catch (and hence revenues) at MEY 
relative to the initial condition.  
 
An  assumption  was  made  that,  predominantly,  crew  wages  were  spent  in  the  local 
community,  while  wages  in  intermediate  sectors  were  spend  outside  the  local  fishing 
communities  (as  many  of  these  goods  and  services  would  be  produced  elsewhere  and 
imported  to  the  local  economy).  On  the  basis  of  this  assumption,  consumption  induced 
income changes in the local fishing communities will track changes in crew wages rather than 
fleet capacity changes. If maintaining economic activity in local fishing communities is seen 
as an important social consideration in fisheries management, then achieving MEY may still 
result in gains to local fishing communities even with large capacity reductions provided that 
catches at MEY are at least the same if not greater than the initial level. 
 
Profits in the I-O framework are effectively considered a leakage from the system, and hence 
do  not  feed  back  into  the  generation  of  additional  economic  activity.  While  some  large   19 
companies  exist,  the  Australian  fishing  industry  –  particularly  the  large  inshore  sector 
managed  by  the  States  –  is  dominated  by  small,  owner-operated  businesses  (Evans  and 
Johnstone  2006).  Hence,  increased  profits  form  part  of  the  income  to  a  large  number  of 
individuals, and it would be reasonable to assume that at least some of this additional income 
would be spend, while the remainder would be invested elsewhere in the economy, potentially 
contributing to additional growth and incomes in other sectors. The consumption induced 
impact on wages arising from increased profits in fisheries assuming all, half or nothing is 
consumed is illustrated in Figure 4. Only the outcomes under the assumption of ±10% change 
and 0% change in revenues are illustrated. However, it can be seen that allowing for increased 
consumption  derived  from  increased  fishery  profits  will,  in  most  cases,  result  in  positive 
induced  incomes,  and  in  others  greatly  decrease  the  level  of  loss  estimated  when  this 
additional  consumption was  ignored.  If  we  further  assume  that  a  large  proportion  of  any 




Discussion and conclusions 
 
The purpose of this paper was to investigate the net economic impact of reducing fishing 
capacity in order to achieve MEY in fisheries. While the analysis was applied to Australian 
fisheries,  these  fisheries  share  common  features  with  a  wide  variety  of  fisheries 
internationally.  Further,  the  net  impacts  were  assessed  with  a  range  of  potential  revenue 
outcomes, enabling general lessons to be learned. The results are hence important to fisheries 
managers and policy makers since they provide an indication of the profitability gains to 
different  fisheries  and  the  potential  costs  to  fishers,  the  intermediate  sector  and  final   20 
consumption of goods and services due to changes in fisheries wages and induced incomes 
through changes in input demands.  
 
The analysis suggests that the two main changes in the fishing sector as a consequence of 
achieving MEY, namely fleet reductions and changes in revenue,have different impacts on 
different parts of the economy. The fleet reduction necessary to achieve MEY results in lower 
input demand and hence lower input costs to the fishery. However, lower input demand from 
the fishery leads to a loss of incomes in the intermediate sectors. This in turn flows through 
the economy in terms of reduced consumption, with an additional loss in incomes as a result. 
Fleet reduction also results in loss of employment in the fishing sector, although the impact of 
this on economic activity will depend on the second main impact of achieving MEY, namely 
changes in catches and revenues. Revenues may either increase or decrease, and the impact on 
consumption, and consumption induced incomes, will depend on the direction of this change. 
 
In  this  analysis,  the  reduction  of  input  costs  in  the  fishery  increases  profits  even  when 
revenues were assumed to decline by 10%. Increases in profits more than offset the losses in 
other  areas  of  the  economy  provided  catches  at  MEY  were  no  less  than  the  initial  (pre-
adjustment) level. Hence, it could be concluded that MEY produces a net benefit to society 
under  such  circumstances.  Effectively,  incomes  from  other  parts  of  the  economy  are 
transferred to the fishing industry in terms of higher profit. This is consistent with the concept 
of rent dissipation in fisheries, as incomes generated in the intermediate sectors form part of 
the cost of fishing. As rent is dissipated in fisheries through increased input use, incomes in 
intermediate sectors increase. Consequently, it could be argued that the existence of these 
incomes in intermediate sectors is an artefact of the market failure in fisheries. However,   21 
when  rent  generation  in  fisheries  is  viewed  as  a  transfer  out  of  other  sectors,  it  is 
understandable that such targets are less desirable politically. 
 
When profits are considered  a form of income  (as would be the  case for owner-operator 
vessels and small companies), additional consumption induced income is generated, such that 
net benefits may exist even with some decrease in total output. The extent to which this may 
occur  is  difficult  to  determine.  However,  unconsumed  profits  are  likely  to  be  invested 
elsewhere in the economy, potentially stimulating economic activity in other sectors. These 
impacts are excluded from traditional I-O analyses. 
 
When  investigating  the  effect  of  MEY  on  local  communities,  the  effect  is  likely  to  be 
beneficial provided that the extra income earned by the crew (and increased profits) is spent 
within the communities. This ignores social consequences such as reduced crew employment. 
However, Australian fisheries in their current state are characterised as providing relatively 
low earnings for labour and lack of obvious career paths to attract and retain quality people. 
As a result, the industry has difficulty in competing with other industries for quality skilled 
labour  and  is  characterised  by  a  high  labour  turnover  (Evans  and  Johnstone  2006).  This 
implies that crew are generally highly mobile, so displaced crew should have little difficulty 
transitioning to other industries.  
 
The analysis may overstate the reduction in incomes following fleet capacity reductions. In 
many cases, less than a 50% reduction in fleet size may be necessary to achieve MEY. A 
smaller fleet reduction would result in lower negative production and consumption induced 
effects. The analysis also does not consider the impact of price changes. Prices for most of the 
high valued species (e.g. lobster, prawns, abalone and tuna) are largely driven by external   22 
markets as most of the product is exported. For the domestic fish market, prices are generally 
inflexible (Bose 2004). Hence, it is expected that quantity changes resulting from achieving 
MEY will have little impact on the price. However, the shift to MEY will require changes in 
the management structure that will also provide incentives for fishers to maximise the value 
of their output. To achieve MEY, some form of rights-based management system will need to 
be  introduced  into  the  fishery  to  remove  the  incentives  that  will  otherwise  dissipate  the 
increased economic profits. In Australian fisheries, ITQs are seen as the most likely candidate 
to achieve this for most (but not necessarily all fisheries). Slowing down the fishing activity 
through removing the incentives to race to fish provides an opportunity for fishers to take 
greater care of their catch, as well as change their fishing behaviour in order to target higher 
valued individuals (e.g. larger animals that receive a higher price per kg). Improvements in 
quality leading to higher prices following the introduction of ITQs have been observed in 
several fisheries (Bernal et al. 1999; Grafton 1996). 
 
This  study  suggests  that,  overall,  achieving  MEY  is  likely  to  result  in  a  net  increase  in 
incomes in the economy, although sectors that previously benefited from overcapitalisation in 
fisheries will incur losses. When taking into account potential price increases that may arise 
through more effective management measures, and the potential consumption induced effects 
arising from increased owner-operator returns, these gains may be substantial.   23 
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Figure 3. Approximate location of wild fisheries 
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Figure 4. Consumption induced income for the ±10% and 0% change in catch scenarios when 
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Table 1. Production (indirect), consumption (induced) and total (type 2) income multipliers 
in the base and scenario analysis 
  Base  Revenue at MEY relative to 2004-05 level 










Tuna and billfish             
·  Indirect effect  1.169  0.678  0.710  0.746  0.785  0.829 
·  Induced effect  1.404  1.086  1.107  1.130  1.155  1.183 
·  Total effect  3.572  2.764  2.817  2.875  2.940  3.012 
Other finfish             
·  Indirect effect  1.075  0.573  0.600  0.630  0.655  0.700 
·  Induced effect  1.343  1.018  1.035  1.055  1.071  1.100 
·  Total effect  3.419  2.590  2.635  2.684  2.727  2.799 
Temperate Prawn             
·  Indirect effect  0.487  0.266  0.278  0.292  0.308  0.325 
·  Induced effect  0.962  0.819  0.827  0.836  0.846  0.857 
·  Total effect  2.449  2.085  2.106  2.129  2.154  2.182 
Tropical Prawn             
·  Indirect effect  1.156  0.632  0.662  0.695  0.732  0.772 
·  Induced effect  1.396  1.056  1.076  1.097  1.120  1.147 
·  Total effect  3.552  2.688  2.737  2.792  2.852  2.919 
Rock Lobster             
·  Indirect effect  0.584  0.320  0.336  0.352  0.371  0.391 
·  Induced effect  1.026  0.855  0.864  0.875  0.887  0.900 
·  Total effect  2.610  2.175  2.200  2.227  2.258  2.292 
Other fisheries             
·  Indirect effect  0.806  0.440  0.461  0.484  0.509  0.537 
·  Induced effect  1.169  0.932  0.945  0.960  0.976  0.995 
·  Total effect  2.975  2.372  2.406  2.444  2.486  2.532 
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Table 2. Change in income to the fishing industry, the intermediate and final demand sectors 
for the different scenarios compared to the base year (2004-05) and likely impact to final 
consumption will have to the local and non-local consumption 
  Revenue at MEY relative to 2004-05 level 










Tuna and billfish           
·  Crew wages  1.8  0.9  0.0  -0.9  -1.8 
·  Owners’ income (profits)  25.2  21.9  18.6  15.3  12.0 
·  Wages in intermediate sectors (indirect 
effect)  -7.5  -7.5  -7.5  -7.5  -7.5 
·  Wages in final consumption of goods & 
services (induced effect)  -3.7  -4.3  -4.9  -5.4  -6.0 
·  Impacts to local consumption  1.2  0.6  0.0  -0.6  -1.2 
·  Impacts to non-local consumption  -4.9  -4.9  -4.9  -4.9  -4.9 
·  Net effect to the economy  15.8  11.0  6.3  1.5  -3.3 
Other finfish           
·  Crew wages  10.3  5.2  0.0  -5.2  -10.3 
·  Owners’ income (profits)  102.3  89.9  77.4  66.2  52.5 
·  Wages in intermediate sectors (indirect 
effect)  -46.1  -46.1  -46.1  -46.8  -46.1 
·  Wages in final consumption of goods & 
services (induced effect)  -23.1  -26.5  -29.9  -33.7  -36.6 
·  Impacts to local consumption  6.7  3.4  0.0  -3.8  -6.7 
·  Impacts to non-local consumption  -29.9  -29.9  -29.9  -29.9  -29.9 
· Net effect to the economy  43.4  22.5  1.5  -19.5  -40.5 
Tropical Prawn           
·  Crew wages  5.5  2.8  0.0  -2.8  -5.5 
·  Owners’ income (profits)  64.7  57.3  50.0  42.7  35.3 
·  Wages in intermediate sectors (indirect 
effect)  -25.5  -25.5  -25.5  -25.5  -25.5 
·  Wages in final consumption of goods & 
services (induced effect)  -12.9  -14.7  -16.5  -18.3  -20.1 
·  Impacts to local consumption  3.6  1.8  0.0  -1.8  -3.6 
·  Impacts to non-local consumption  -16.5  -16.5  -16.5  -16.5  -16.5 
·  Net effect to the economy  31.8  19.9  8.0  -3.9  -15.8 
Temperate Prawn           
·  Crew wages  1.1  0.5  0.0  -0.5  -1.1 
·  Owners’ income (profits)  6.1  4.9  3.8  2.7  1.5 
·  Wages in intermediate sectors (indirect 
effect)  -2.1  -2.1  -2.1  -2.1  -2.1 
·  Wages in final consumption of goods & 
services (induced effect)  -0.7  -1.0  -1.4  -1.7  -2.1 
·  Impacts to local consumption  0.7  0.4  0.0  -0.4  -0.7   29 
·  Impacts to non-local consumption  -1.4  -1.4  -1.4  -1.4  -1.4 
·  Net effect to the economy  4.4  2.3  0.3  -1.7  -3.7 
Rock Lobster           
·  Crew wages  14.3  7.2  0.0  -7.2  -14.3 
·  Owners’ income (profits)  84.6  71.9  59.3  47.4  34.0 
·  Wages in intermediate sectors (indirect 
effect)  -33.3  -33.3  -33.3  -33.3  -33.3 
·  Wages in final consumption of goods & 
services (induced effect)  -12.3  -16.9  -21.6  -26.2  -30.9 
·  Impacts to local consumption  9.3  4.7  0.0  -4.7  -9.3 
·  Impacts to non-local consumption  -21.6  -21.6  -21.6  -21.6  -21.6 
·  Net effect to the economy  53.4  28.9  4.4  -19.3  -44.5 
Other fisheries           
·  Crew wages  3.2  1.6  0.0  -1.6  -3.2 
·  Owners’ income (profits)  28.9  24.3  19.7  15.1  10.5 
·  Wages in intermediate sectors (indirect 
effect)  -10.4  -10.4  -10.4  -10.4  -10.4 
·  Wages in final consumption of goods & 
services (induced effect)  -4.6  -5.7  -6.7  -7.8  -8.8 
·  Impacts to local consumption  2.1  1.0  0.0  -1.0  -2.1 
·  Impacts to non-local consumption  -6.7  -6.7  -6.7  -6.7  -6.7 
·  Net effect to the economy  17.1  9.8  2.6  -4.7  -11.9 
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Net economic impacts of achieving maximum economic yield in 
fisheries: supplementary information  
 
The purpose of this document is to provide supplementary information on income multiplier 
estimation as well as a brief critical justification of the input-output methodology rather than 
general equilibrium modelling. 
 
We also provide details on data sources used in the analysis. As data were not available for 
all fisheries, or were available for only part of the fishing sector included in the analysis, a 
number of assumptions were required to generate the transactions table used in the analysis. 
These assumptions are also detailed below. 
 
Income multiplier estimation and limitations 
 
The simple income multiplier shows the effects of the initial income effects plus all of the 
production  induced  rounds  of  extra  output.  The  total  income  multiplier  captures  the  two 
effects  captured  by  the  simple  multiplier  plus  the  consumption  induced  effects.  The 
calculation of these two multipliers is obtained by multiplying the following matrices: 
 
    Simple multiplier = W*Z              (2) 
       Total multiplier = W*B^              (3) 
 
Where W is the initial income effects vector obtained by dividing each industries’ wages by 
its corresponding level of output. From these, the production, consumption and total effects 
(aka Type II multiplier) due to a one dollar increase in the wages of the industry investigated   33 
can  be  estimated.  The  Type  II  multiplier  is  the  sum  of  the  production  and  consumption 
induced effects plus the value of 1 representing the initial effect. 
    Production induced effects = (simple multiplier – W)/W 
    Consumption induced effects = (total multiplier – simple multiplier)/W 
    Type II = Total multiplier/W  
 
As with most modelling techniques, there are certain limitations to I-O models. Foremost of 
these is that I-O models assume that production is subject to constant returns to scale. That is, 
an x% increase in final demand will result in an x% increase in the use of intermediate inputs. 
Further, they are assumed not to vary through time (i.e. are static) and that the pattern of 
inter-industry linkage is insensitive to changes in the relative price of inputs. Finally, I-O 
assumes excess supply in factor markets. That is, any increase in demand can be met without 
any pressure on factor prices. 
 
An alternative methodology for assessing flow on effects from changes in the fishery is sector 
is  the  development  of  Computable  General  Equilibrium  models  (CGE).  These  have  an 
advantage in that they allow for substitution of inputs within the economy in response to a 
change in factors prices. For example, the increased availability of labour as a result of the 
reduction in crew employment would lead to a reduction in labour prices, and growth in other 
sectors that could use these inputs. Further, they do not require the assumption of constant 
returns  to  scale.  A  key  disadvantage  of  CGE  models  is  that  they  require  an  even  larger 
amount of data that is often not possible to trace when investigating smaller industries such as 
fisheries (Berck and Hoffmann 2002). Further, their added complexity – particularly if non-
linearities are introduced – requires greater aggregation of the sectors to find a solution. As 
the  fishing  industry  in  total  represents  less  than  half  of  1  per  cent  of  the  total  GDP  in 
Australia, changes in the sector will have very little impact in a CGE model other than what   34 
can  be  estimated  using  an  I-O  model.  Further,  disaggregating  the  industry  into  different 
fisheries would also result in even fewer benefits of a CGE model relative to an I-O model.  
 
 
Information used to develop the I-O model 
 
The value of production for each of the 13 sectors was obtained from the 2004-05 production 
tables supplied by the Australia Bureau of Agriculture and Resource Economics (ABARE 
2008). The ABARE estimate of the total value of Australian fisheries production in 2004-05 
($2,086 million) was smaller than the estimated value of fisheries production in the I-O table 
from ABS for this same year ($2,500 million). To maintain consistency with the remainder of 
the table, the total values for each of the wild and farmed fish sector from the ABARE data 
were increased by the same proportion in order to equal the value of fisheries production in 
the ABS I-O table.       
 
The  costs  structures  (representing  input  use)  for  each  fishing  sector  were  derived  from 
published cost and earning studies (Table 1). Data were available for one or more fisheries 
within each fishing sector. For those fisheries where information was not available, costs 
structures in similar fisheries were assumed to be representative. For the wild fishery sectors, 
the proportion of inputs going into the seven new sectors in the year 2004-05 were obtained 
from ABARE’s survey reports  and the Primary Industries and Resources of South Australia 
(PIRSA) in their economic indicator reports (Table 1).  
 
Information on cost structures relating to the six new farmed fisheries sectors, were also 
derived  from  a  number  of  sources  (Table  2).  In  some  cases,  data  were  not  available  for 
Australian  production  (e.g.  salmon  and  pearl  farming),  so  data  from  other  countries  and 
sectors were used. In other cases, data were available but were relatively dated. In these   35 
instances, it was assumed the proportion of inputs into the aquaculture sectors have remained 
constant over time.  
 
The  distribution  of  the  output  of  the  different  wild  and  farmed  fisheries  sectors  were 
estimated based on ABARE’s export reports (ABARE 2008), Ruello & Associates (2008) 
report on the Queensland seafood supply chain in 2008 and consultations with experts in the 
field. These data were used to allocate the outputs to the different sectors as intermediate 
inputs. Total outputs across all fisheries to each intermediate and final use were given in the 
original ABS I-O table. 
 
The Input-Output table is presented in tables 3 and 4. The six farmed fish groups have been 
aggregated in order to reduce the size of the Input-Output table in this document. In Table 3 
the inter-industry matrix and value added section for the different intermediate sectors is 
presented. The number of intermediate sectors expands this table into two pages. In the first 
page agriculture and forestry, aquaculture and the different wild fisheries is presented. The 
continuation over the next page of table 3 represents all the other intermediate industries. In 
Table 4 the final demand and value added for the different intermediate sectors is presented.    36 
Table 1. Data sources and assumptions used in the analysis- capture fisheries production 
Fishery investigated / Location  Data available on financial 
performance 
Location of fishery in 
report 
Reference  Assumptions 
Northern prawn (NP) fishery 
(average per boat) 2004-05 
Commonweatlh 
(between Cape York in 
QLD and Cape 
Londonderry in WA) 
Vieira and Hohnen (2007)  WA prawn fishery assumed to have a 
similar cost structure to that of NP 
Tropical prawns (Commonwealth, 
QLD, NSW, WA) 
Torres Strait prawn fishery 
(average per boat) 2004-05 
Commonwealth (Torres 
Strait) 
Vieira and Hohnen (2007)  QLD and NSW prawn fisheries assumed to 
have a similar cost structure to Torres 
Strait fishery 
Gulf Saint Vincent prawn fishery 
2004-05 
SA  Clark et al. (2008)  VA prawn fisheries assumed to have a 
similar cost structure to Gulf St Vincent 
prawn fishery 
Temperate prawns (SA, VA) 
Spencer Gulf and West Coast 
prawn. 2004-05  
SA  Clark et al.  (2007f)   
SA Northern Zone Rock Lobster 
Fishery, 2004-05 
SA  Clark, et al. (2007a)   Rocklobster (Commonwealth, 
NSW, VA, QLD, WA, SA, Tas) 
SA Southern Zone Rock Lobster 
Fishery, 2004-05 
SA  Clark, et al. (2007b)  
Commonwealth and other states are 
assumed to have a similar cost structure to 
the average rocklobster fishery production 
in Northern and Southern SA 
Abalone (NSW, VA, WA, SA, 
Tas) 
SA Abalone fishery, 2004-05  SA  Clark, et al. (2007c)   Assumed the SA fishery represent 
production costs of other states 
Other fisheries (i.e. molluscs and 
crustaceans) (Commonwealth, all 
states) 
SA Blue Crab fishery, 2004-05  SA  Clark, et al. (2007d)   The fishery’s cost structure represent that 
of other crustaceans and molluscs  
Tuna and billfish 
(Commonwealth, WA, SA,  NT) 
Eastern tuna and billfish fishery 
(average per boat) 2004-05 
Commonwealth   Vieira, et al. (2007)   Assumed the fishery represents the costs of 
WA, SA and NT tuna fishery 
Gillnet, hook and trap sector 
(average per boat) 2004-05 
Commonwealth  Vieira, et al. (2007)  The sector assumed to represent total shark 
production 
Commonwealth trawl sector 
(average per boat) 2004-05 
Commonwealth  Vieira, et al. (2007)  Total finfish minus tuna, sardines and 
sharks 
Other Finfish (Commonwealth, 
all states) 
SA Sardine fishery, 2004-05  SA  Clark, et al. (2007e)   Assumed the fishery represents the costs of 
production in other states (VA and WA) 
Queensland=QLD; NSW=New South Wales; NT= Northern Territory; SA=South Australia; Tas=Tasmania; VA=Victoria; WA=West Australia   37 
Table 2. Data sources and assumptions used in the analysis- aquaculture production 
Sector investigated / Location  Data available on financial 
performance 
Location of fishery in 
report  Reference  Assumptions 
Prawns (NSW, QLD) 
  Prawn farm model, 2000  QLD  Johnston (2000)  Assumed cost structures valid for 2004-05 
Oysters (NSW, QLD, SA, Tas) 
 
Oyster sector cost structure, 2006-
07  SA  Econsearch, personal 
communication, February 2009  Assumed cost structures valid for 2004-05 
Pearls (WA, SA) 
       
Cost structure assumed to be generally 
similar to that of oyster production, with a 
larger labour component 
Salmon (NSW, Vic, SA, Tas) 
 
Norwegian salmon (average farm) 
2004-05  Norway  www.fiskeridir.no 
Australian salmon producers assumed to 




Tuna farming sector cost 
structure, 2006-07  SA  Econsearch, personal 
communication, February 2009  Assumed cost structures valid for 2004-05 
Mussel farming (average farm) 
1989-90  VA  Treadwell, et al. (1991) 
Cost structure assumed to have remained 
similar over time. Also other farmed 
molluscs are assumed to have a similar 
cost structure to mussel farming 
Barramundi farming (average 
farm) 1989-90  QLD  Treadwell, et al. (1991) 
Cost structure assumed to have remained 
similar over time. Also other farmed 
finfish (except salmon and tuna) are 
assumed to have a similar cost structure to 
mussel farming 
Other (All States) 
Crayfish farming (Yabbies, 
Marron and Redclaw) (average 
cost of each crustacean in farms), 
1989-90 
Farm model  Treadwell, et al. (1991)  The farm models assumed to represent the 
average Australian production 
Queensland=QLD; NSW=New South Wales; NT= Northern Territory; SA=South Australia; Tas=Tasmania; VA=Victoria; WA=West Australia 
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prawn  Abalone 
Agriculture & Forestry  6,334.0  0.0  0.0      0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Aquaculture  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Other finfish  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Other fisheries  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Rock Lobster  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Tuna and billfish  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Tropical prawn  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Temperate prawn  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Abalone  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Mining  24.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Processed food & Drinks  1,033.0  112.4  4.9  3.2  28.7  6.4  1.2  0.2  0.9 
Textile & Wood products  224.0  2.2  6.6  0.8  3.5  5.8  6.1  0.3  1.8 
Fuel, chemicals & metals  1,997.0  7.0  68.0  18.4  45.5  10.5  67.8  2.9  2.8 
Machinery & Equipment  183.0  11.2  28.0  12.2  17.8  5.2  21.6  1.8  5.2 
Construction & Repairs  545.0  14.7  20.0  7.9  16.4  3.2  13.9  1.5  5.5 
Trade & Transport  3,326.0  39.3  97.3  8.3  42.7  10.8  21.2  3.0  12.5 
Government & Services  2,920.0  51.5  24.7  9.7  36.3  5.4  20.3  2.2  13.9 
Total Intermediate Uses  16,586.0  238.3  249.5  60.4  190.9  47.5  152.0  11.9  42.5 
Value added                            
Wages  5,543.0  137.4  103.4  32.2  143.4  17.7  55.2  10.9  49.8 
Profits  19,176.0  223.1  46.6  52.4  124.5  10.9  11.7  16.1  153.7 
Taxes less subsidies  194.0  2.6  2.3  0.6  1.5  0.3  1.2  0.2  1.1 
Imports  848.0  19.3  17.3  4.7  11.2  2.1  9.2  1.8  8.3 
Total Production  2,700.0  139.5  40.3  13.1  33.2  7.4  35.6  2.3  7.6   39 
 
Table. 3. Inter-industry matrix and value added sections in the Input-Output table (continuation) 



















Industry Uses  
Agriculture & Forestry  46.0  17,085.0  1,677.0  219.0  1.0  105.0  1,864.0  794.0  28,125.0 
Aquaculture  0.0  64.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  298.3  0.0  362.6 
Other finfish  0.0  85.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  4.0  45.7  33.0  168.5 
Other fisheries  0.0  4.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  38.8  0.0  43.5 
Rock Lobster  0.0  102.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  90.0  0.0  192.1 
Tuna and billfish  0.0  42.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  5.0  0.0  47.8 
Tropical prawn  0.0  66.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  62.9  0.0  129.0 
Temperate prawn  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  4.3  0.0  4.3 
Abalone  0.0  145.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  20.0  0.0  165.2 
Mining  10,362.0  379.0  139.0  18,797.0  136.0  527.0  1,445.0  3,453.0  35,262.0 
Processed food & Drinks  36.0  6,840.0  114.0  359.0  146.0  300.0  10,783.0  2,085.0  21,854.0 
Textile & Wood products  204.0  1,764.0  4,179.0  1,349.0  663.0  5,871.0  6,717.0  10,617.0  31,615.0 
Fuel, chemicals & Metals  3,571.0  2,844.0  2,433.0  23,890.0  7,844.0  23,039.0  8,630.0  10,777.0  85,248.0 
Machinery & Equipment  671.0  291.0  277.0  662.0  3,958.0  6,620.0  4,272.0  6,768.0  23,805.0 
Construction & repairs  1,607.0  836.0  960.0  1,505.0  921.0  56,614.0  11,579.0  21,941.0  96,591.0 
Trade & Transport  3,880.0  7,927.0  3,653.0  10,083.0  7,456.0  10,754.0  19,906.0  29,432.0  96,652.0 
Government & Services  7,051.0  6,864.0  7,389.0  14,439.0  7,597.0  36,728.0  74,241.0  210,454.0  367,847.0 
Total Intermediate Uses  27,428.0  45,341.0  20,821.0  71,303.0  28,722.0  140,562.0  140,002.0  296,354.0  788,112.0 
Value added                            
Wages  8,767.0  10,066.0  11,159.0  19,403.0  12,929.0  39,025.0  78,093.0  245,583.0  431,118.0 
Profits  36,003.0  7,781.0  8,197.0  14,953.0  5,391.0  34,111.0  44,911.0  193,564.0  364,726.0 
Taxes less subsidies  -626.0  354.0  337.0  280.0  249.0  935.0  4,533.0  8,087.0  14,353.0 
Imports  514.0  588.0  561.0  996.0  618.0  1,695.0  6,061.0  14,061.0  26,016.0 
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Table 4. Final demand and value added sections in the Input-Output table 
 
Final Consumption 
Expenditure  Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
Final demand matrix 














Agriculture & Forestry  4,708.0  133.0  2,244.0  0.0  0.0  2,945.0  6,892.0  16,922.0  45,047.0 
Aquaculture  294.1  42.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  61.2  397.6  760.2 
Other finfish  206.7  25.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  6.4  52.7  291.0  459.4 
Other fisheries  120.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  120.0  163.5 
Rock Lobster  252.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.0  58.2  312.6  504.7 
Tuna and billfish  24.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  14.0  38.0  85.8 
Tropical prawn  146.9  26.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  -37.4  0.0  136.1  265.1 
Temperate prawn  25.9  13.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  38.9  43.2 
Abalone  97.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  97.9  263.1 
Mining  393.0  0.0  236.0  76.0  42.0  1,790.0  37,743.0  40,280.0  75,542.0 
Processed food & Drinks  29,263.0  39.0  248.0  13.0  27.0  -39.0  15,941.0  45,492.0  67,346.0 
Textile & Wood products  9,270.0  2.0  1,079.0  59.0  208.0  178.0  4,814.0  15,610.0  47,225.0 
Fuel, chemicals & Metals  10,178.0  1,609.0  3,100.0  162.0  297.0  437.0  27,483.0  43,266.0  128,514.0 
Machinery & Equipment  12,455.0  7.0  12,307.0  420.0  768.0  587.0  9,113.0  35,657.0  59,462.0 
Construction & repairs  14,723.0  2,769.0  93,256.0  8,117.0  13,106.0  -72.0  1,561.0  133,460.0  230,051.0 
Trade & Transport  125,970.0  2,824.0  17,915.0  515.0  1,474.0  13,939.0  28,029.0  190,666.0  287,318.0 
Government & Services  217,886.0  152,846.0  21,674.0  3,817.0  2,239.0  -4.0  18,326.0  416,784.0  784,631.0 
Total Intermediate Uses  426,014.0  160,336.0  152,059.0  13,179.0  18,161.0  19,732.0  150,088.0  939,569.0  1,727,681.0 
Value added                   
Wages  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  431,118.0 
Profits  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -29.0  0.0  -29.0  364,696.9 
Taxes less subsidies  46,334.0  0.0  13,620.0  21.0  63.0  -2.0  1,395.0  61,431.0  101,800.0 
Imports  45,473.0  1,921.0  29,518.0  841.0  2,081.0  1,095.0  5,911.0  86,840.0  190,196.0 
Total Production  517,821.0  162,257.0  195,197.0  14,041.0  20,305.0  20,796.0  157,394.0  1,087,811.0  2,815,492.0 
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